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NOTES
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SERVICE BY
PUBLICATION
Under the early practice a decree of a court of equity could
operate only sn personam, the legal right was affected only by
what was done under the decree.' The plaintiff in a suit for
specific performance of a contract to convey land was without
legal title if the defendant refused to convey Today this un-
warranted restriction on the power of a court of equity has been
abolished in most states either by statutes or decisions granting
power in the proper case to convey legal title.2 Thus, where the
land is within the jurisdiction of the court and the defendant is
present, his refusal to obey a decree to convey is of no signifi-
cance, by decree or by the act of a court commissioner title is
given to the plaintiff. But the decisions vary as to whether suit
may be entertained where a non-resident defendant is served by
publication only The answer depends upon the nature of the
statutes giving mn rem power to the court and providing for con-
structive service, and upon what the court interprets the nature
of the action to be.
It is well settled that each state has exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over the property within its borders and its law
regulates the manner in which the rights and privileges pertain-
mg thereto may be transferred and enjoyed. 3 Therefore, where
Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading (2d ed.) 35 and note 4
(1883) Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed.) Vol. 2, sec. 428;
Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 37.
'Huston, The Enforcement of Equitable Decrees. (1915) 13.
McCornck v Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 6 L. Ed. 300 (1825),
United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24 L. Ed. 192 (1876) Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 544 (1877) "The question is not what
a court of equity by virtue of its general power and in the absence
of statute, might do, but it is what jurisdiction has a state over titles
to real estate within its limits, and what jurisdiction may it give by
statute to its own courts, to determine the validity and extent of the
claims of non-residents to such real estate? If a state has no power
to bring a non-resident into its courts for any purpose by publica-
tion, it is impotent to perfect the titles to real estate within its limits.
But no such imperfections attend the sovereignty of the state.
It cannot bring the person of a non-resident within its limits-
its process goes not beyond its borders-but it may determine the
extent of his title to real estate within its limits; and for the purpose
of such determination may provide any reasonable methods of im-
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by statute the court has zn rem power and where it is specifically
provided that in suits for specific performance against non-resi-
dent vendors of land process may be served by publication, the
courts invariably sustain jurisdiction.4 But, where the construc-
tive service statute enumerates certain actions wherein it may
be used, it is held that this imnpliedly excludes all others.5 Where,
however, the constructive service statute is worded generally,
with no reference to the kind of action in which it may be used,
there is a question as to whether a suit against a non-resident for
specific performance of a contract to convey domestic land is
included. If the action is considered to be sn rem the court may
obtain jurisdiction on constructive service. 6 If the action is
interpreted as one sn personam, then any such attempt to obtain
jurisdiction is void7 since the process of one state cannot run
into another and bring the person of a non-resident within its
limits. 8 The answer to the problem depends on whether the
court reasons that by virtue of the sn rem statute the action for
specific performance is changed to one, the object of which is to
determine the rights and interests in land, and therefore sub-
stantially sn rem, or whether, since the decree is in part an order
compelling the defendant personally to do a certain act, the
•action remains, as traditionally, a suit strictly sn personam.
In Atlantic Seaboard Natural Gas Co. v. Whitten,9 the court,
taking the view that the action is sn personam, said.
"The suit before us is not specifically directed toward the res;
it is directed toward the owner of the res. The status of the Yes is
not in the slightest degree affected until after the suit against the
parting notice. The well-being of every community requires that
the title to real estate therein shall be secure, and that there be con-
vement and certain methods of determining any unsettled questions
respecting it." Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 33
L. Ed. 918 (1889).
'Watters v. Southern Brighten Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S. . 87
(1929), Light v Doolittle, 77 Ind. App. 187, 133 N. E. 413 (1921),
Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 AtI. 442
(1908), Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52 (1875).
5 Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U. S. 466, 7 L. Ed. 922 (1830).
'Garfem v. McInnms, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928), Clem
v. Given's Exr. et al., 106 Va. 145, 55 S. E. 567 (1906).
'Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U. S. 466, 7 L. Ed. 922 (1830),
Kinkead v. Clark, 239 S. W 717 (Tex. Civ. App.) (1922), Atlantic
Seaboard Natural Gas Co. v Whitten, 315 Pa. 529, 173 Atl. 305
(1934).
'Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918
(1890), Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 544 (1877).
' 315 Pa. 529, 173 Atl. 305 (1934).
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owner is terminated .adversely to the latter. Until that stage is
reached, the suit is entirely a proceeding between persons and not
between a person and a certain piece of land as, for example, in con-
demnation or foreclosure proceedings. The suit here is to
determine the respective personal rights and obligations of the op-
posing parties in the gas content of the land owned by this
non-resident defendant."
It is true that in form the proceeding is in personam, but
it is confusing form with substance to say that since the res is
not affected until after the suit is terminated adversely to him
the action is entirely against the person of the owner. The real
object of the suit is not to enforce a personal liability as in the
case of a suit for damages for breach of contract, nor it is to
compel personal performance of an act by the defendant. It is
rather to obtain a decree depriving the defendant of his interest
in the land, vesting it by force of the decree or commissioner's
deed in the plaintiff. Thus, although the action is in form zn
personam, since the real object is to dispose of sn rem rights, it
is, as said in Garfien v. Mclnnis,:0 "substantially" in rem.
In Clem v Given's Exr.,11 a Virgnna case, the plaintiff had
a contract whereby the non-resident executor, having power of
" "Though the court cannot by constructive service obtain
jurisdiction of the person of a non-resident defendant, and cannot
compel such a defendant to obey its decree, where the court has the
power to make a decree which will affect the interests of a party in
property within the state, whether that party obeys the decree or not,
the action is not purely in personam. The court's decree acts upon
the property as well as the person of the non-resident defendant. In
such case the objection that the court by constructive service obtains
no jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident is without force.
It has changed the nature of the action from an action in per-
sonam to an action substantially in rem." 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73
(1928)
- 106 Va. 145, 55 S. E. 567 (1906). The court cited Sec. 3418 of
the Virginia Code (1904) which provided: "A court of equity, in a
suit wherein it is proper to decree or order the execution of any deed
or writing, may appoint a commissioner to execute the same.
In comparison see Kentucky Code Sec. 394 which provides: "Real
property may be conveyed by a commissioner appointed by the
court. (1) If by the judgment in an action a party be ordered
to convey such property to another."
The Virginia Code (1904) provided for process by publication in
Secs. 3230, 3231 and 3232. As to the effect of these sections the court
said: 'While the language of these sections is general, we are of the
opinion that it comprehends quasi proceedings in rem, the object of
which is to reach and dispose of property within the state." Com-
pare sections 56 and 57 of the Kentucky Code which provide that
constructive service may be had against defendants who are non-
residents of the State or upon whom, for specified reasons, actual
service cannot be had.
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attorney to sell land of the deceased, agreed to convey Virginia
land. Upon refusal of the executor to convey, the plaintiff sued
for specific performance, serving process by publication. Al-
though by statute the court had general sn rem powers and
although the publication statute did not specify particular in-
stances wherein it might be applied, the court held that service
by publication was sufficient in this case. The court cited
Roller v Holly,12 winch says.
"When the statute specifies certain classes of cases which may
be brought against non-residents, such specification doubtless op-
erates as a restriction and limitation upon the power of the court;
but where the power is a general one, we know of no principle upon
which we can say that it applies to one class of cases and not to
another."
The Virginia court said further that where constructive
service on non-residents is generally provided for by statute,
suits against non-residents for specific performance of contracts
to convey realty would have to be included. Otherwise all suits
affecting title to land such as partition and foreclosure actions
would have to be excluded and a primary object of the statute
would thereby be defeated. One eminent writer in speaking
of the effect of sn ren statutes on the nature of such actions, has
stated.
'Under many such statutes the decree is still in form sn personam
-a personal order,--but by virtue either of the decree itself or the
proceedings taken under it, the complete title passes to the plaintiff.
Doubtless under other statutes the decree may be in form either
%n rem (i. e., it may purport itself to vest the title in the plaintiff) or
&n personam, or perhaps both. Under all of them the equitable action
against the vendor for specific performance is clearly an action
sn rem, both as to its object and as to the effects of the decree and
proceedings under it."'
This problem has not confronted the Kentucky Court under
the present code, although under earlier statutes it apparently
considered the action to be sn rem. .4 The case of Hynes v
" 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup. Ct. 410, 44 L. Ed. 520 (1900)
"Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev 37, 127.
'Hynes v. Oldham, 19 Ky. (8 T. B. Mon.) 266 (1826), Nesbit v
Gregory, 30 Ky. (7 J. J. Mar.) 270 (1832) Berryman v. Mullins, 47
Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 152 (1847) See also Dickens v King, 26 Ky (8 J. J.
Mar.) 591 (1830). The statutes under which these cases were de-
cided provided in general terms for the sn rem power of the court
and service by publication. See Littel's Digest of the Statute Law of
Kentucky (1822) Vol. I, pages 62, 63, 228, 322. See also Grubbs v.
Steele, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 570 (1855) where the statutes provided
that the county court had power to convey title through appointed
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OldhamW5 involved the validity of a conveyance made by a com-
missioner in pursuance of a decree taken for confessed in a suit
for the conveyance of land where unknown heirs and a non-resi-
dent were served by publication. It was held that although
there was an irregularity in the publication process the court
had jurisdiction since the defendant had been properly warned
and therefore the decree ordering a conveyance was merely
erroneous and not void nor subject to collateral attack.
Also in Berryman v Mullins6) where the non-resident de-
fendants were served by publication, the court said.
"The land was in the county of Livingston and a conveyance
sought from non-resident heirs, in virtue of a claim, or obligation
upon their ancestor. In support of the jurisdiction of the Livingston
Circuit Court, in view of these facts, the case of Hynes vs. Oldham,
(3 Monroe, 266), is directly in point. In Dickens vs. King, (3 J. J.
Marshall, 591), this court say, 'unknown heirs or non-resident de-
fendants may be proceeded against with a view to obtain titles, in
the Circuit in which the land lies. Tis is a principle of necessity
sanctioned by statute. Unknown heirs and non-residents can be
reached in no other way.' With these authorities before us, we need
not stop to inquire whether the jurisdiction has been expressly con-
ferred by statute or assumed from necessity. It is sufficient that we
consider the principle as settled."
The statutes under which these cases were decided provided
that where one claimed land "as locator or by bond or other
instrument of writing" he could proceed to obtain a conveyance
of the same by serving process on non-resident defendants by
publication.17  Also, if the defendant refused to convey the
land, the court could appoint a commissioner to make the con-
veyance and thereby vest legal title in the plaintiff.is Obviously,
in these cases the court considered the action to be sn rem since,
if the action were in personam, the process provided by the stat-
ute would have been ineffective.
The present sections of the Kentucky Code concerning con-
structive service do not specify particular proceedings wherein
commissioners and also that in a suit for specific performance of a
contract to covey land in Kentucky the non-resident vendor could
be served by publication. The court said that jurisdiction was af-
forded when the statute was properly followed. See REVISED STAT-
UTES OF KENTUCKY (1850), Chap. 57, Secs. 1, 2, 7.
119 Ky. (8 T. B. Mon.) 266 (1826)
247 Ky (8 B. Mon.) 152, 153 (1847).
17See Littel's Digest of the Statute Law of Kentucky (1882),
Vol. 1, 62.See Littel's Digest of the Statute Law of Kentucky (1882),
Vol. 1, 228, 322.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
it may be used. It is provided in section 56 that where the de-
fendant is a non-resident the plaintiff may serve process by
causing a copy of the petition with a summons annexed to be
delivered to the defendant by a person to whom he is personally
known.19 Sections 57-61 provide that constructive service is
had when an appointed attorney has taken the proper measures
to warn the non-resident defendant to appear.20 It is clear that
under either method of service a personal judgment is im-
proper.21 However, since in Kentucky the action has been con-
sidered sn ren,22 thins limitation is not applicable and therefore
it may be said that the court has jurisdiction where a non-resi-
dent defendant in a suit for specific performance of a contract
to convey Kentucky land has been served in accordance with the
relevant sections of the code.
ROBERT S. HAMNDo
' Kentucky Code, sec. 56.
'Kentucky Code, sec. 57-61.
2 Kentucky Code, sec. 419.
" Supra note 14. However, in Talbot v. Bowen, 8 Ky. (1 A. K.
Mar.) 436 (1819), it was held error to appoint a commissioner to
convey without giving the defendant a day to do so. Thus, as to the
form of the decree and the one day period in which the defendant
may convey, the action is in form zn personam. But, it cannot be
said that the in 'em qualities of the action are thereby obliterated
since, should the defendant refuse to convey, the effect of the decree
is of an in rem nature. See also, Dan Cohen Realty Co. v. National
Savings & Trust Co. et al., 125 Fed. (2d) 288 (1942).
